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s recent as the 1960s, Mexico did
not rank among the world’s lead-
ing international tourist destina-
tions. Other than cultural heritage
sites around Mexico City and the
beaches in Acapulco and Ver-
acruz, little else captured foreign
tourists’ imagination. Five decades
later international tourism has
become one of Mexico’s leading
sources of foreign currency along
with petroleum exports, assembly
manufacturing, and remittances.
Since the mid-1990s over 20 mil-
lion international tourists have
visited Mexico each year (ca. 90 %
from U.S. and Canada). In 2006
international tourism generated
US$ 12.1 billion in revenue and
employed roughly one out of 
every ten workers in the country
(Clancy 2001, WTO 2007).
The transformation of Mexico’s
tourism industry did not occur 
by happenstance (Clancy 2001).
Since 1974 most of the country’s
tourism promotion and develop-
ment has rested in the hands of
the federal government who
ensures that their newest coastal
resorts are of the highest quality.
This has consistently ranked Mexi-
co among the top ten international
tourist destinations in the world
over the past fifteen years (WTO
2007). The ongoing success
Mexico enjoys, however, masks
the challenges and difficulties the
country’s tourism industry has
endured. A look back at the evolu-
tion of tourism in Mexico over the
past 50 years reveals three distinct
generations of coastal tourist re-
sorts targeted to foreign visitors. 
Evolution of international
seaside tourism in Mexico
In 1927 the Mexican government
took its first step in tourism devel-
opment when it built the “High-
way of the Sun” linking Mexico
City with the new seaside resort of
Acapulco (Nolan and Nolan 1988,
Zaragoza and Rojas 2000). Their
intention was to diffuse tourism
away from the capital city and
redirect it toward the Pacific coast.
Beyond this project, tourism in
Mexico prior to the 1940s can best
be described as an unplanned and
largely ignored part of the national
economy (Gladstone 2005). In the
1930s, for example, most interna-
tional tourists who visited Mexico
originated in the U.S. and spent
the bulk of their time in one of 
the border towns. In these early
years, the biggest factor impacting
Mexican tourism was its proximity
to the U.S. (Stronge and Redman
1982, Clancy 2001). Until 1970,
over 60 % of Mexico’s foreign
tourists arrived via ground trans-
portation (Gladstone 2005).
Following World War II, inter-
national tourism in Mexico began
a slow but protracted growth.
With Europe heavily damaged,
Mexico sought to become an
alternative destination for the in-
creasingly affluent U.S. and Cana-
dian citizens (Nolan and Nolan
1988, Clancy 2001). Realizing 
that the greatest impediment to
increased international tourism
was the underdeveloped trans-
portation infrastructure, Mexican
As the world’s leading service sector, interna-
tional tourism offers developing countries
opportunities for lucrative business investment,
a major source for foreign currency, and the
creation of jobs. Mexico’s leading position
among Latin American and Caribbean interna-
tional tourist destinations rests largely on its
concerted efforts to capitalize on the aesthetic
appeal of its coastal locations. Over the last 
50 years Mexico has witnessed three genera-
tions of seaside resorts catering to internation-
al visitors. The lessons learned by the Mexican
government should be considered by other
countries developing large-scale coastal
tourism. 
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Photo 1: Hotel zone in Ixtapa, Mexico
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President Miguel Aleman Velasco
(1946–1952) allocated federal
funds to build a network of roads
and airports (Zaragoza and Rojas
2000, Clancy 2001). When Holly-
wood’s jet setting crowd began
arriving in the 1950s, Acapulco
became known as the first interna-
tional resort dependent upon air-
borne tourists (Turner and Ash
1975). Furthermore, as diplomatic
relations between the U.S. and
Cuba deteriorated in the early
1960s, Mexico’s popularity among
U.S. citizens increased.  
Mexico’s First Generation
resorts
Blessed with spectacular scenery, 
a warm climate, and attractive
beaches, most of Mexico’s first
generation international tourist
destinations were former fishing
villages (Figure 1). As local busi-
ness interests realized tourism’s
income potential, the economic
foundation of places like Acapul-
co, Puerto Vallarta, Mazatlán, and
Cozumel changed to better accom-
modate foreign visitors. For exam-
ple, with an infusion of money
from domestic business investors,
the calm, clear waters teaming
with fish around Cozumel quickly
led to Mexico’s largest island being
reputed as one of the world’s top
five scuba diving destinations. For
the most part, there was no co-
ordinated effort by local or federal
governments to anticipate or
address issues accompanying in-
ternational tourism development.  
As a result, by the 1970s many
of these first generation destina-
tions (especially Acapulco) were
suffering under the pressures of
largely unplanned and uncon-
trolled growth. Concerns include
intense overcrowding, inadequate
housing, poor infrastructure,
severe air and water pollution, 
and extensive environmental
degradation. In 2007, for example,
Greenpeace reported that Puerto
Vallarta emitted 49,248 cbm3
(cubic meters) of wastewater into
surrounding Banderas Bay daily
and fecal bacteria levels are
sixteen times higher than World
Health Organization (WHO)
standards (FNS 2007b).
Because of so many negative
consequences associated with
spontaneous large-scale tourism,
the reputation of nearly all first
generation resorts has been tar-
nished. Many of these interna-
tional destinations are reinventing
themselves to stay competitive.
The island of Cozumel, for exam-
ple, has become a leading port-
of-call for the cruise ship industry
hosting 35 vessels each week
during the high season (November 
to January). Acapulco has re-
sponded with dramatic renovation
projects. In both 2006 and 2007 
it outpaced all other Mexican
coastal locations in tourism devel-
opment with most of the projects
Figure 1: Map of Mexico’s international tourist resorts Cartography: J.S. Smith
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featuring gated, all-inclusive 
hotels that enable foreign visitors
to avoid the problems that plague
most of the city. Although each 
of these destinations continues to
appeal to vacationers, their popu-
larity has waned. Foreign tourists,
in particular, have turned to
Mexico’s second generation of
tourist resorts.  
Mexico’s Second Generation
resorts
In 1961 the Mexican government
established PRONAF (Programa
Nactional Fronterizo – National
Border Program) to improve the
seedy image of the country’s
border towns (Arreola and Curtis
1993). Federal funds and special
financial incentives prompted
public beautification projects
throughout the border region, but
the bulk of the monies were in-
vested in the tourist gateway cities
of Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, and
Nogales (Figure 1). For the first
time federal tourism planning
proved to be a lucrative source 
of income for Mexico.
Galvanized by PRONAF’s
success, in the mid-1960s Banco
de Mexico (Bank of Mexico) creat-
ed INFRATUR (Fondo de Promo-
ción de Infraestructura Turística –
National Fund for Promoting
Tourism Infrastructure) and by
1968 the agency released the re-
sults of its three year study which
called for a series of new resorts
and aggressive international mar-
keting (Clancy 2001, Brenner and
Aguilar 2002). Coincidently, the
simultaneous discovery of oil
provided the collateral needed to
secure international loans that
would finance the construction
projects. On 29 December 1973,
INFRATUR was absorbed into a
new government agency. Being
allocated substantial federal finan-
cial support and unbridled author-
ity, the two-fold purpose of
FONATUR (Fondo Nacional de
Fomento al Turismo – National
Fund for the Development of
Tourism) has been to develop and
manage the country’s coastal re-
sorts and prevent the reoccurrence
of the mistakes made in places like
Acapulco (Call 2001). Thus, begin-
ning in the early 1970s interna-
tional tourism in Mexico entered 
a new era. 
Under FONATUR’s careful
scrutiny and using the latest in
computer tourism research,
Cancún emerged as the first of
Mexico’s second generation
resorts (Dunphy 1972; Figure 1).
With an initial loan of US$ 21.5
million from the Inter-American
Development Bank (Clancy 2001),
Cancún’s location possessed 
many of the desired qualities for 
a luxury resort. Moreover, the
Mexican government felt its place-
ment on the Yucatan Peninsula
would allow it to compete with
tourism in the Caribbean. In the
mid 1970s international tourists
began arriving and by 1986
Cancún was drawing more foreign
visitors annually than Acapulco
(Nolan and Nolan 1988, Clancy
2001). 
As the Mexican government’s
first state-planned mega-resort,
every detail in Cancún was
painstakingly considered. Erd-
mann Gormsen (1982) reports
that in the beginning Cancún was
a planned city for both tourists
and residents alike. FONATUR
wanted workers to feel they were
an important part of Cancún’s
success so they would provide 
a pleasing atmosphere for foreign
tourists (Dunphy 1972). Over 
the next three decades, Cancún
and neighboring Puerto Juarez
grew from roughly 300 inhabitants
in 1974 to approximately 300,000
(Zaragoza and Rojas 2000).
Today, local residents and interna-
tional tourists no longer share the
same space. Instead, Puerto Juarez 
has become the segregated bed-
room community that houses
workers who fill Cancún’s service




tourist destination boasts 26,560
hotel rooms and receives approxi-
mately 6 million visitors each year
(The Economist 2005). By itself, it
accounts for nearly 20 % of all
international tourists who visit
Mexico and more than 30 % of the
country’s total foreign currency
earned via tourism (Gladstone
2005). 
Unfortunately in the late 1990s
Cancún began experiencing some
of the same unattractive qualities
that have plagued Acapulco and
many other first generation resorts.
Cancún’s unabated expansion
became overwhelming and its in-
frastructure was sorely overtaxed.
FONATUR responded by investing
considerable capital into cleaning
up the resort’s tarnished image
with renovation and new con-
struction projects. 
In October 2005 however,
Hurricane “Wilma” stalled over
Cancún for nearly 48 hours caus-
ing over US$ 2 billion in damages
to the resort’s infrastructure.
FONATUR officials saw this as a
blessing in disguise; the natural
disaster provided a rare opportuni-
ty to completely rebuild Cancún
and enhance its long term interna-
tional appeal. The Mexican gov-
ernment, for example, spent US$
20 million to double the width of
the beaches as it brought back the
sand that had washed away. Re-
markably, by the summer of 2006,
the rebuilt resort was once again
welcoming visitors.  
Cancún is only one of
FONATUR’s five master-planned
resorts intended to serve as inter-
national tourist “growth poles”
throughout the country. The other
four mega-resorts are Ixtapa, 
Los Cabos, Huatulco Bay, and
Loreto (Figure 1). Although three
of the remaining four resorts 
were conceived at roughly the
same time as Cancún, according 
to David Gladstone (2005), the
Mexican government never in-
tended to develop them simulta-
neously. Having benefitted from
lessons learned in both Acapulco
and Cancún, FONATUR has con-
tinually revised its plans for the
remaining resorts with the inten-
tion of maintaining their long-
term appeal and economic vitality.
The second resort to receive
FONATUR’s undivided attention
was Ixtapa. 
Located 160 kilometers (100
miles) north of Acapulco, the
Mexican government’s initial in-
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tent in site selection for Ixtapa was
to expand the Mexican Riviera
tourist zone and diffuse the pres-
sures of tourism throughout the
state of Guerrero (Brenner 1999).
Construction of Ixtapa’s first high-
rise hotel began in 1976, yet it 
was not until the mid-1980s that
FONATUR began investing con-
siderable money – some US$ 22
million in loans from the World
Bank – into the local services and
infrastructure (Nolan and Nolan
1988). Tourism officials take 
pride knowing that today Ixtapa
has all of the requisite services and
amenities expected of a world-
class tourist destination (Photo 1).
Despite not having the same
international name recognition as
Cancún or Los Cabos, Ixtapa
averages nearly 300,000 visitors
each year making it FONATUR’s 
third most successful resort
(FONATUR 2003, Brooke 2008).
Plus, starting in the winter of 
2006 Ixtapa – Zihuatanejo began
hosting approximately 1,000 
cruise ships each year.  
Markedly different from Can-
cún’s initial development, tourism
officials employed the strictest
regulations on development. With
a minuscule population of 5,000
residents, Ixtapa has been closely
managed to ensure a high quality
experience for international visi-
tors. The sister city of Zihuatanejo
(population of 57,000 in 2000)
was always envisioned as the
principal labor and commercial
center for the area (Reynoso y
Valle and de Regt 1979, INEGI
2000). Much like it has done in
other second generation resorts,
FONATUR has used the natural
environment and man-made
barriers to ensure that tourists and
local residents remain segregated
(see Textbox). 
Prior to its initial development
in 1976, Los Cabos attracted
mostly deep sea fishermen from
the U.S. (Figure 1). Today, with
foreign visitors outnumbering
domestic travelers eight to one,
Los Cabos is the most internation-
alized of FONATUR’s five state-
planned resorts (Gladstone 2005).
Furthermore, Los Cabos and its
sister city Cabo San Lucas have
become Mexico’s most expensive
international tourist destinations.
Many of the properties fall within
the super-luxury category with
some rooms renting for as much as
US$ 800 per night (Brooke 2008).
Despite the expense, Los Cabos
ranks second after Cancún as
FONATUR’s most successful in-
ternational tourist resort.
Founded in 1697 by Father
Salvatierra as the first Catholic
mission community along the
Pacific coast, Loreto served for
132 years as the capital of Baja
California del Sur (Baird and
Bairstow 2004; Figure 1). Due 
to severe aridity, extreme geo-
graphic isolation, and a catas-
trophic hurricane in 1829, the seat
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Photo 2: Main beach in Playa del Carmen, Mexico 
Photo 3: Main street in Majahual, Mexico 
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By the time FONATUR gave its undivid-
ed attention to the development of
Ixtapa, it had already learned that inte-
grating tourists and local residents
within a world-class resort was not opti-
mal. Thus, one of the most attractive
qualities of the greater Ixtapa – Zihu-
atanejo area is its advantageous physi-
cal setting (Figure 2). As FONATUR’s
marketing brochure indicates: “Where
many saw only an immense mountain
range next to the sea, we saw a perfect
scenario” (FONATUR 2003). Separating
the luxury tourist resort of Ixtapa from
the bedroom community of Zihuata-
nejo is a substantial mountain ridge
(Photo 4). Although only 5 kilometers
separate the two communities, the
physical challenge of surmounting the
steep slope is more than enough to dis-
courage casual, non-vehicular traffic.
The mountain serves as an effective
barrier between the two communities.
In addition to capitalizing on the local
topography, FONATUR has taken other
more deliberate measures to ensure
that Ixtapa remains an exclusive space
for tourists. In the late 1980s local busi-
ness investors pressured the local gov-
ernment to provide more affordable
worker housing. In 1994, Colonia La
Puerta was established at a straight-
line distance of about 1.5 kilometers 
(0.9 miles) from Ixtapa’s main beach.
According to local officials, after ap-
proval for the new residential space was
awarded by the state government,
FONATUR stepped in and exercised its
unbridled authority to ensure that local
residents of Colonia La Puerta would 
be served by their own commercial cen-
ter (Cruz 2003). More importantly,
FONATUR constructed a double wide
cinder block wall to separate Ixtapa
from Colonia La Puerta (Photo 5). Much
like the mountain ridge that separates
the laboring residents in Zihuatanejo
from their jobs in Ixtapa, the wall is 
a formidable barrier between the
working-class population in Colonia La
Puerta and Ixtapa’s tourist space.
FONATUR has employed the strictest
regulations on development with the
intent of ensuring a high quality tourist
experience well into the future. 
Textbox: A segregated space for tourists in Ixtapa
Figure 2: Map of Ixtapa, Mexico and vicinity
Photo 5: View of Ixtapa and Colonia La Puerta from mountain ridge 
Photo 4: Mountain ridge separating Ixtapa
and Zihuatanejo, Mexico 
Ixtapa Hotel Zone Cinder Block Wall
Colonia La Puerta
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of government was moved south
to La Paz. FONATUR should have
portended the challenges it faced,
but in 1976 the agency began
developing the mega-resort. From
the outset, attracting business in-
terests to invest in Loreto’s future
was problematic, and despite
creating a 2,065 km2 (= square
kilometre; app. 797 square miles)
marine park in 1996, Loreto has
become little more than a mega-
disappointment. Today, the resort
has five small hotels and features
only 138 rooms (Gladstone 2005).
Ever since it’s opening, Loreto has
sat idle waiting to be discovered by
the next foreigner on a mission.
After a ten year hiatus, and
perhaps giving itself time to lick 
its wounds, in 1984 FONATUR
began building its newest state-
planned resort. Huatulco Bay was
designed to spread out over nine
bays and numerous nearby islands,
a project expected to take 34 years
to complete (Figure 1). The Huat-
ulco Bay that hugs the Oaxacan
coastline today is a scaled back
version of FONATUR’s original
vision. There are 17 low-density,
low-rise hotels that line two of the
nine bays (Gladstone 2005). The
remaining seven bays and islands
have been set aside as a 29,500
hectare (73,000 acre) nature pre-
serve intended to rival ecotourism
in Costa Rica (Zaragoza and Rojas
2000, Clancy 2001, Brenner and
Aguilar 2002).  
With the exception of Loreto,
FONATUR’s “growth pole” resorts
have become Mexico’s premier
destinations for international
tourists. Collectively, they receive
40 % of all foreigners who visit
Mexico and generate 54 % of the
revenue entering the country due
to tourism (Brooke 2008).
Mexico’s Third Generation
resorts
Mexico’s newest generation of
international tourist resorts exhibit
considerable diversity but share
two things in common. First, they
are largely a reaction to the “Aca-
pulcoization” and unattractive
qualities that have scarred many of
the first two generations of resorts.
Second, the newest resorts tend to
cater to a more affluent or specifi-
cally targeted clientele. As middle-
class tourists and spring breakers
have spoiled some of the mega-
resorts, an increasing number of
vacationers are seeking out more
“genuine” or “alternative” experi-
ences. The current tourism litera-
ture identifies this type of tourism
as “niche” tourism (Meyer-Arendt
2002). 
In the late 1980s, the govern-
ments in Mexico, Guatemala, El
Salvador, Belize, and Honduras
envisioned creating a scenic byway
for international tourists known as
La Ruta Maya (The Mayan Route)
that would feature archaeology
sites and nature preserves centered
around the ancient Mayan culture.
The shared vision was to become 
a perfect example of alternative
tourism. Although little has come
in the way of realizing La Ruta
Maya, Mexico is creating its own
scenic byway along the Caribbean
coast of the Yucatan Peninsula.  
Local developers and business
investors in conjunction with the
Mexican government are building
a four-lane highway between Can-
cún and Chetumal. If all unfolds as
planned, lining the highway will be
upscale, all-inclusive hotels and
exclusive clubs that will cater to
the world’s most affluent vacation-
ers. Thus far two areas along the
Yucatan coast have received de-
velopers’ attention.  
In the north lies the Mayan
Riviera (an area extending 130
kilometers, 81 miles, from south 
of Cancún to Tulum including
Playa del Carmen; Figure 1). In
the mid-1980s Playa del Carmen
was little more than a nascent
hotel zone with a small boat
dock. Its raison d’etre was point
of departure for ferries that shut-
tled tourists between the main-
land and the island of Cozumel.
Today, Playa del Carmen has
grown into a dense complex of
hotels, condominiums, restau-
rants, strip malls, and upscale
boutiques (Photo 2). In 2006 a
previously undiscovered Mayan
temple was unearthed and quickly
became a new tourist attraction 
in the area. Like the rest of the
Yucatan Peninsula south of Can-
cún, all of the buildings are less
than five stories tall enabling
them to blend in with the local
vegetation. This northern third of
the Yucatan coast has seen the
greatest infusion of investment
capital and construction activity
with the hopes that it will eventu-
ally rival Cancún as an interna-
tional tourist destination.  
The southern third of the Yu-
catan coast is referred to as Costa
Maya (Mayan Coast) – an area
extending from Punta Herrero to
the Belize border (Figure 1). Be-
cause the highway has yet to reach
this section of the peninsula, little
tourist infrastructure has been
developed. In July of 2007 the area
around Majahual showed consid-
erable evidence of impending de-
velopment but it featured only one
modern hotel, a dedicated tourist
shopping area dominated by
kitschy souvenir stands, and some
small boutiques that lined the
village’s sand covered main street
(Photo 3). In the mid-2000s two
cruise lines (Carnival and Royal
Caribbean) helped fund the con-
struction of a deep sea dock that
would accommodate four cruise
ships simultaneously. Unfortunate-
ly, nearly everything, including
their “private beach”, was de-
stroyed when Hurricane “Dean” 
(a category 5 storm) passed over
Majahual in August of 2007. Until
the dock is rebuilt, cruise ships
will no longer stop in the area. 
The hope was that by 2012 Costa
Maya would alleviate some of
Cancún’s population pressure 
and provide an alternative to the
Mayan Riviera. Clearly, Costa
Maya has a long way to go before
it will become a serious destina-
tion for international tourists. In
2007 federal legislation was intro-
duced to allow foreigners to own
land within 50 kilometers of
Mexico’s coast (FNS 2007a). Such
legislation would greatly facilitate
investment in places like Costa
Maya.  
Nestled between the Mayan
Riviera and Costa Maya is the 
Sian Ka’An Biosphere and Natural
Reserve (Figure 1). The area is
designated by the Mexican govern-
9Geographische Rundschau International Edition Vol. 5, No. 1/2009
310901_04_10_Smith.qxd  23.11.2008  19:39 Uhr  Seite 9




















ment for environmental protec-
tion, but local tour operators are
not only permitted, but encour-
aged, to make ecotourism forays
into the park.  
Not to be left out, FONATUR
has identified two new resorts 
that will cater to ultra wealthy 
and elite international tourists
seeking solitude and sanctuary
from the masses. Spearheaded 
by outgoing President Vicente 
Fox, the federal government gave 
a green light to Mexico’s newest
state-planned resort. Located 
61 kilometers (38 miles) north 
of Puerto Vallarta, Litibú will be 
one of the world’s most exclusive
beach resorts (Figure 1). With 
an initial investment from the
Mexican government of US$ 50
million, the construction of a new
highway, marina, eight five-star
hotels, and a theme park have
already begun. By 2025, Litibú is
expected to have six commercial
areas, multiple shopping centers,
and three golf courses – one de-
signed by Greg Norman. The low-
density, low-impact development
has much potential, but the costs
of constructing the resort are con-
siderable given its remote location
and distance from Puerta Vallar-
ta’s international airport (VIVA
2008).
The other FONATUR spon-
sored tourist destination is Esca-
lera Nautica (Nautical Staircase;
Figure 1). Modeled on the same
principle as the string of missions
built by early Spanish settlers
along the Camino Real, Escalera
Nautica will be a series of luxury
hotels and small seaside resorts
ringing the Sea of Cortez in the
states of Baja California Norte,
Sonora, and Sinaloa. Instead of
finding a resort one days walk or
cart ride away, the distance be-
tween marinas will be one day’s
travel by boat (ca. 120 nautical
miles). The ultimate plan calls for
22 marinas, golf courses, and the
typical upscale tourist amenities.
Once completed (possibly as soon
as 2010) the government expects
no less than 52,000 U.S. boat
owners to drive inland from Mexi-
cali to the marina at San Felipe
(Brooke 2008) and enjoy the sub-
lime resorts that line the Gulf 
of California coastline like a pearl
necklace. 
Conclusion
As state-planned tourism increas-
ingly becomes a leading model for
economic development, the Mexi-
can government’s experience with
three generations of resorts over
the past 50 years provides many
lessons to share with the rest of
the world. First, large-scale un-
planned tourism that neglects the
environmental consequences of
development can significantly limit
the life span of a resort. Second,
state-planned mega-resorts domi-
nated by high-rise hotels and
massive commercial development
have become less appealing to
international visitors than resorts
that blend in with the local envi-
ronment. Next, as ecotourism is
supplanted by “alternative
tourism”, resorts need to identify
what niche they can best fill and
market themselves accordingly.
Finally, thorough background re-
search is needed to critically assess
the potential return and interna-
tional popularity of a tourist desti-
nation. Not all coastal locations
are a “field of dreams”. Just be-
cause you build a resort with all
the amenities does not mean inter-
national tourists will come. ■
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